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It would be an understatement to say that poverty reduction is one of the most important 
goals of our time. Much has been written on this topic, and the fight against world 
poverty is now almost forty years old. In 1973, Robert McNamara, President of the 
World Bank, made a speech about the need to fight global poverty, a speech that 
launched concentrated work, effort and aid towards poverty reduction by the developed 
and developing world.  
 
The World Bank estimate for world poverty for 2004 was 970 million.2 That is, close to a 
billion people have consumption expenditures of less than 1.08 dollars a day in 1993 PPP 
prices.3 This number is not that much different from the one that prevailed a decade 
earlier—1.13 billion in 1990. In 1981, global poverty was estimated as 1.5 billion. What 
has changed over the last two decades is the composition of the poor—in 1981, both 
India and China contributed two-thirds (1 billion) to the total. Poverty then was 
essentially an India-China story. More than two decades of growth later, the importance 
of India-China is substantially reduced, but for some methods, the share in world poverty 
for these two Asian economies is around 30 percent. 
 
Both Bhalla (2002), Imagine there’s no country: Poverty, inequality and growth in an era 
of globalization, hereafter referred to as Imagine, and Sala-i-Martin (2006) have 
contended that world poverty is significantly below the World Bank estimates. 
Depending on assumptions, our estimates for global poverty for 2005 range from about 
200 to 500 million, an order of magnitude lower than the official estimates. Which set of 
estimates are “correct” has enormous implications for aid and development policy, and 
for evaluations of how the globalization growth process in the last twenty years has 
affected the lives of the poorest.  
 
These “new” estimates have been partly based on the old method of estimating poverty, 
and the one followed universally till the early nineties (see Ahluwalia, Carter, Chenery 
1979—here onwards referred to as ‘ACC’—for the first such estimate). The ACC method 
relies upon national account means of per capita consumption, and household survey 
distributions of consumption (or income).4 Critics have rejected such estimates of 
poverty, for two reasons: first, that survey based estimates of per capita consumption, and 
not national accounts based estimates, are a more reliable estimate for the “true” mean; 
and second, that if the distribution of the survey distribution is trusted, then so must the 
mean be trusted. This paper is not about poverty estimates as revealed by household 
survey data “matched” with national accounts data.5 Rather, this paper is about the 
authenticity and reliability of survey based measures of poverty. If the survey estimates 
are accurate or “correct”, what can we say about poverty, inequality, and growth in the 
developing economies for the period 1980 to present? If they are not correct, then can 
 
alternative more accurate estimates of poverty be presented, and estimates based on all 
the available data, surveys and national accounts?  
 
This chapter is also properly viewed as an extension of the poverty estimates reported in 
(Bhalla 2003c, 2004a). Bhalla 2003c documented how World Bank data and poverty 
measurement methods (i.e. using survey, not national account means) themselves 
indicated that the Millennium Development Goals of reducing poverty to 15 percent of 
the developing country population by 2015 had already been reached—and reached at 
about the same time as the goals were being formulated in 2000. Bhalla 2004a 
documented how some of the important parameters of World Bank poverty calculations 
(e.g. growth in per capita consumption between 1987 and 1998) could not be reproduced 
by the country specific data on survey means made available by the World Bank on its 
website.   
 
Given this inaccuracy, there is a need to develop alternative estimates of world poverty 
according to survey means not suffering from World Bank “adjustments”. Several 
agencies now publish estimates of both survey means and distributions, two essential 
ingredients in the calculation of poverty. WIDER, in particular, provides detailed 
estimates of distributions.6 This paper uses data from all available sources to construct 
three estimates of poverty—the World Bank method with only World Bank data, the 
World Bank method with all available data and third, an alternative method also using all 
available data.7  
 
 
This new method incorporates all the characteristics of survey data except one, the noisy 
and declining character of survey capture: the ratio of household survey means to 
national account means (S/NA). This method forces the ratio of the survey mean to 
national accounts mean to be constant and reflect the value obtained in an arbitrary year, 
chosen to be 1987 for all the countries. The reason this year was chosen was because 
generally, for most countries, the survey capture ratio started to decline somewhat sharply 
after the mid-eighties. A declining survey to national accounts ratio means that the 
growth rate in survey consumption is most likely understated, and understated by the 
percent decline in the survey to national accounts ratio. If the S/NA is understated, then 
absolute poverty is overstated. 
 
This new method allows the survey/national accounts ratio to be different across 
countries, but to stay constant within a country, and constant at its 1987 value or if a 
survey was not conducted in that year to be constant at the value of the latest survey prior 
to 1987. The distribution of consumption, used by us, the World Bank, Sala-i-Martin, etc. 
are all similar, if not identical, and do so because they originate from the same source, 
household surveys; and unlike for survey means, researchers have generally refrained 
from “adjusting” data on distributions. 
 
The three methods yield differing estimates of poverty, but strikingly, the strong result 
that emerges is that regardless of the method chosen, developing country poverty in 2005 
was already close to the MDG goal of 15 percent for 2015; that world poverty today is 
essentially about poverty in Africa; and that the World Bank estimates of poverty in India 
 
seem to be gross over-estimates, and estimates not corroborated by other researchers or 
institutions (e.g. the official government of India estimate for poverty  in India, for the 
same poverty line as that used by the World Bank, is about 7 percentage points lower in 
1993/1994). 
 
Given this overwhelming evidence in favor of significant poverty reduction in the 
formerly poorest part of the world, Asia, and especially given the magnitude of poverty 
reduction in the two large countries, India and China, this paper argues that time has 
come to raise the decades old poverty line from $1 a day (1985 PPP prices) to a poverty 
line significantly higher, around $2.16 per capita per day in 2005 prices.   
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the data used in 
generating poverty estimates. This section also documents that the World Bank poverty 
line of PPP$1.08 in 1993 prices is exactly equal to the government of India poverty line 
developed in 1973/74. This equivalence is an important input in documenting the 
exaggeration present in World Bank poverty estimates. The same poverty line should 
yield the same level of poverty, but as just noted for India, the World Bank, inexplicably, 
has a poverty level that is 7 percentage points higher! Section 3 analyzes other reasons 
for different poverty estimates; in particular, the overestimation in poverty caused by the 
rather slow rate of consumption growth revealed by means based on household surveys, a 
decline not corroborated by trends in an alternative estimate of consumption, namely the 
national accounts. The systematic nature of the decline in S/NA should prohibit a blind 
 
acceptance of survey means; hence, the need to develop an estimate of growth in survey 
means.   
 
Section 4 emphasizes the role played by the clustering or congestion of people close to 
the poverty line; different degrees of this congestion affect interpretation of poverty 
trends, and interpretation of how good (or bad) economic growth, or initial inequality, has 
been in reducing poverty. The magnitude of the poverty decline is shown to be 
independent of initial inequality.   
 
Section 5 presents estimates of poverty for different time-periods and different regions of 
the world. This section shows that using official i.e. government data and a constant 
S/NA ratio, and all other parameters the same as the World Bank, world poverty in 2005 
is reduced from the World Bank estimate of 970 million to less than 500 million.  
 
Section 6 examines the data on national poverty lines in the world, and concludes that the 
world poverty line of $1.08 a day is too low. With development, poverty is reduced, and 
the world’s perception of poverty has moved away from absolute poverty to a notion of 
relative poverty. Most of the developing world, except sub-Saharan Africa, is in that 
transition mode; hence, time for the aid community to adjust and raise the standard for 
being poor—and raise it to PPP$1.70 per capita per day in 1993 prices, or 2.16 per capita 
per day in 2005 prices. Section 7 concludes.  
 
Data, methods and results—an overview 
 
 The study of poverty, and its determinants, requires that definitions of three important 
variables be explicit, and clear. The three variables are poverty, the distribution of 
consumption (inequality), and growth in per capita consumption. There are several 
definitions of Poverty, but the one used here is the head-count ratio i.e. the fraction of the 
population whose per-capita expenditures (or income) are less than, or equal to, a pre-
defined level of expenditures given by a “poverty line”. Inequality can be measured by 
several indices (share of expenditures of the bottom 20 percent, the ratio of mean 
expenditures of the bottom 20 relative to the top 20 percent, the Gini index, etc). All 
these are aggregate indices—the point of departure of our analysis is that what matters for 
the analysis of poverty is not aggregate inequality but inequality at (or close to) the 
poverty line.  
 
Differences in definitions of Growth and differences in sources of data for growth (and 
levels) cause very large differences in estimates of levels and trends in poverty. There 
are, before modifications, two sources for consumption means—that obtained from 
national accounts (NA) data and that obtained from household surveys (S). There are 
natural differences between the two sources because of differences in definition, coverage 
(e.g. institutions are part of NA but not of surveys8), measurement (survey consumption 
is measured directly while NA consumption is often a residual) and prices. These 
differences fail to account for more than a small fraction of the two means, say about 5 
percent or so. The differences in growth of survey or NA consumption are even smaller 
(since the differences in levels are likely to persist).  
 
 However, there are other problems with World Bank world poverty estimates, in addition 
to  differences between NA adjusted (for definitions and comparability) and survey 
means. These problems arise because the World Bank adjusts survey means for some 
countries, particularly for the two large poverty countries, India and China. The same 
source for distribution and the mean (for example, National Sample Survey (NSS) data 
for India) should ordinarily yield the same estimate for absolute poverty. For 1993/94, the 
World Bank estimate of all India poverty is 42 percent;9 the government of India estimate 
for the same year, using the same NSS data, is a considerably lower 36 percent; on a 
population of 900 million, that is an extra 54 million people deemed Indian poor by the 
World Bank. The divergence increases for the survey year 1999/00. Again, for the same 
poverty line, the World Bank estimates 36% poor, in comparison, the government of 
India estimate is 26 percent—that’s an extra 100 million poor in India, and the world.  
 
It can be argued that the difference arises because the World Bank uses the international 
poverty line of PPP$1.08 a day, 1993 PPP prices, while the government of India uses its 
own national poverty line with a 1973 base year. But for the 1993/94 NSS survey year, 
and hence for all years, the $1.08 and the Indian poverty line are identical. This identity 
holds for all other years since the two organizations update the poverty lines by inflation, 
and will hold until either the Indian government, or the World Bank, changes its 
definition of the absolute poverty line. Bhalla (2002b) argues that a large country, namely 
India (and a country with the most research on absolute poverty) might have been the 
 
basis for the world poverty line; the identity in Indian and World Bank poverty lines may 
not be a coincidence. This is demonstrated next.   
 
Equivalence between Indian national poverty line and $1.08 per capita per day  
The Indian poverty line is defined in terms of 30 day consumption and in 1993/94 was 
equal to Rs. 206 in the rural areas and Rs. 286 in the urban areas, or an all India average 
of Rs. 227 per capita for 30 days. This yields a per day average of Rs. 7.57. The World 
Bank consumption PPP exchange rate for 1993 is given as 7.02 yielding the national 
Indian poverty line, in PPP 93 terms, of 7.57/7.02 or $1.0810. A number exactly the same 
as the international poverty line.  
 
Different methods of estimating survey means 
 
The non-reproduction of the poverty estimates for India by the World Bank is one source 
of difference between our and World Bank poverty figures. A larger difference is caused 
by the trend in the survey to national accounts ratio.  Survey based means (and the 
implied growth) do not account for the possibility that the survey to national accounts 
ratio might diverge significantly for different years for the same country. The emphasis 
on the same country is important because differences in methods of data gathering, etc. 
can and does cause significant differences in S/NA across countries. But for the same 
country, the S/NA ratio is expected to move in a narrow range across time, as it was for 
most of the countries of the world until the mid-1980s. 
 
 
A declining S/NA trend means that the mean survey consumption level declines (relative 
to a constant S/NA) by 1 percent for each 1 percent decline in the S/NA ratio. The head 
count ratio of poverty, ceteris paribus, increases by approximately 0.5 percentage point 
with each 1 percent decline in the S/NA ratio. To correct for this tendency, our method is 
to “impute” a survey mean. Recall that the traditional method of estimating survey means 
was to make them equal to national account means. Our procedure is to adjust the survey 
mean to a survey mean adjusted for unusual declines (or increases) in the S/NA ratio. 
This adjusted mean is likely to be closer to the underlying reality than the measured 
survey mean.   
 
Divergence between survey mean and national accounts mean – example from India 
The trend in S/NA is on the basis of surveyed households. Divergence between this and 
the “true” mean can arise due to two factors; under-reporting of consumption, and non-
survey of a large consumption set of households. What might such magnitudes be? In 
Imagine, the issue of greater under-reporting by the rich was examined in detail for one 
large poor country, India, using its household (NSS) survey for 1993-94 and national 
accounts data for the same year. The method was to “blow up” the survey based estimates 
to the NA means for 18 major consumption items. This means that if a person consumed 
X percent of the survey mean, she would consume the same X% of the NA mean. If she 
does not consume potatoes in the surveys, no potatoes are allocated to her in the 
(adjusted) estimate. If a person does not consume TVs, or cars, none of the “missing” 
TVs is allocated to this person. This method estimates an adjusted consumption estimate 
for each household and therefore allows for percentile distributions of the adjusted 
 
consumption estimate to be derived. The mean of the survey estimate for each item is 
“forced” to equal the mean NA estimate for the same item; hence, by construction, the 
survey mean is made equal to the national accounts mean.  
 
The results were revealing—the bottom 40 percent of the population understated their 
expenditures by 29 percent while the average household understated its expenditure by 34 
percent. The top 20 percent (the rich) understated their expenditures by 41 percent. Two 
conclusions are relevant—first, even the poor understate their true consumption, an 
occurrence documented by the fact that even for food items, expenditures are 
increasingly being understated in the surveys. Second, there is a large 12 percentage point 
gap between the understatement of the rich and the poor. However, since the adjustments 
are made with reference to average expenditures, the “error” between the rich and the 
poor has only a small magnitude – only 5 percent. In other words, if India is a typical 
poor country, the “error” made by using NA per capita expenditures rather than survey 
expenditures is only around 5 percent at a point  in time,11 and almost zero percent for 
changes over time. To reiterate: the matching of survey consumption with national 
accounts consumption, often involving a large adjustment in the former, fails to reveal 
any large differences in the magnitude of underestimation between the rich and the poor, 
at least for 5 survey years for India (1983, 1987/88, 1993/94, 1999/2000 and 2004/5).  
 
The survey mean does not incorporate the possibility that some rich people are missed by 
the surveys (due to high walls, security guards etc.). By how much would the survey 
mean be lower than the NA mean in this instance? One plausible, though not likely, 
 
estimate is that the survey fails to sample anyone in the top 2 percent of the population.. 
Since most of the top 2 percent reside in the four major cities of India, this assumption 
means that no top 2 percent household was sampled in the four major cities of Delhi, 
Mumbai, Calcutta and Chennai. The expenditure of this top 2 percent in developing 
countries is not likely to be more than 10 percent of total consumption. If the extreme 
assumption is made that all of these 20 million top individuals (2 percent of the 
population) were missed by the household surveys in India, it would mean that the S/NA 
ratio for developing countries should still be close to 90 percent. In 2004/5, the survey to 
NA ratio in India was less than 50 percent.  
 
The consumption share of the top 1 and 2 percent of the population in India in 1999/00 
(NSS survey) was 7.5 and 3.5 percent, respectively. This yields 11 percent as the total 
share of the top 2 percent and fits in with the conjecture above. But the argument can be 
made (and is made!) that the surveyed households are not the “true” top 2 percent, or at 
least a large number are not. Banerjee and Piketty (2005) use Indian tax return data to 
estimate the shares of the top 1 percent of the population for various years 1952-2000. 
They find the income share of the top 1 percent was 8.5 percent in 1993/94 and 9 percent 
in 1999/2000, for a mean level of Rs. 230,000 for the top 1 percent in the latter year. But 
these shares seem to be underestimates. One indication of this possibility is that the 
consumption share is in the same ballpark. The second indication is provided by estimate 
of GDP and private income (personal disposable income plus income taxes). For the 
same year, the two levels are Rs. 19,520 billion and Rs. 14,800 billion, respectively. The 
population in 1999/2000 was 1 billion which yields the share of the top 1 percent at 11.8 
 
percent of GDP and 15.5 percent of private income. Simple calculations suggest that such 
large shares for the top 1 percent are inconsistent with shares of income observed for the 
fourth and fifth quintile in India (about 22 and 50 percent, respectively).  
 
Taking all the factors responsible for differences in survey and NA means, including non-
coverage of the super rich and larger understatement by the surveyed rich, a very 
conservative assumption is that household surveys (in a poor country like India) can be 
expected to miss out on no more than 10-15 percent of total expenditures in any given 
year. In contrast, the measured survey to consumption ratio in India was 49 percent in 
2004/5, down from 55 percent in 1999/2000 and 62 percent in 1993/1994. These are large 
gaps, gaps that cannot be explained by assumptions of missing out the rich living in gated 
communities etc. Further, the under-estimation is across all commodities, including and 
especially food. The rich, even with their wealthy incomes, cannot consume all of this 
unmeasured food, or even most of it, or even more than a small fraction.   
 
 A rough break-up of this 15 percent understatement is that two-thirds of this difference is 
likely due to definitional and other reasons, and one third (or 5 percentage points) may be  
due to extra understatement by the rich, extra with reference to the understatement of the 
average consumer. This implies that around 85 to 90 percent is a reasonable estimate of 
the survey to national accounts ratio i.e. to make a conversion from national account 
estimate to the “correct” survey estimate, one should discount or reduce the NA estimate 
by around 10 to 15 percent. Survey to NA ratios of 70, 60 or 50 percent cannot therefore 
be accurate, given all that we know of the limits to human consumption, especially of 
 
such limits to food consumption. A lower bound of  S/NA ratio is likely to be about 80 
percent; anything below this number is likely to mean that expenditures of the poor are 
actually being under-reported i.e. household surveys are likely to be overstating poverty 
for such countries.  
 
Declining S/NA ratio observed for most countries 
The breakdown in S/NA in the late eighties can be illustrated with data for the ratio for a 
few countries. In India, the S/NA was 78.2 percent in 1977/78, 71.2 percent in 1987/88, 
55.5 % in 1999/00 and 48.7 percent in 2004/5. For China, the ratio declined from 91 
percent in 1981 to 82.2 percent in 2001. For Korea, the ratio was 84.8 percent in 1971 
and 60.3 percent in 1992. Out of 74 non-industrialized countries with more than one 
expenditure (or income) household survey in the post-1980 period, more than two thirds 
(50) witnessed a decline between the first and last survey post 1980; only 24 witnessed an 
increase.12   
 
Figure 3.1a plots the pattern of the S/NA ratio for India and China.  It is plotted on a dual 
scale and suggests both that declines have been steep for the two countries (India is 
larger) and that the timing of the decline has been very similar. On average, the S/NA 
ratio for developing countries declined by about 10 percentage points in the decade 1991-
2001 (Figure 3.1b). Given that for the average developing country the S/NA ratio was 82 
percent in 1991, a 10 percentage point decline in subsequent years translates into a 
decline of 12 percent in estimated survey consumption, i.e. on average, 12 percent of the 
 
gain in mean consumption of the average (or poor person) is “missing” or unaccounted 
for in survey expenditures.   
 
Figure 3.1a: Survey to National Accounts Ratio in India and 
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Figure 3.2 documents the evolution of mean expenditures for non-OECD countries (the 
survey to national accounts ratios reported above are derived from these means) as 
calculated by Deaton (2004, p. Fig. 3)13, by the World Bank (Chen-Ravallion) and by us. 
The numbers are reported in logs so percentage changes can be read easily from the 
charts. Data are presented for developing economies i.e. economies excluding the western 
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Note: WBS refers to World Bank method and data; S refers to data from all available 
surveys, and SNAk represents the method where the survey to national account ratio 
is kept constant at the observed 1987 level for each country. 
 
Deaton (2004) reports survey based growth for non OECD countries to be 2.8 percent a 
year for the ten year period 1990-2000 (his Table 3); from his Figure 3, we obtain the 
annualized growth rate to be approximately 0.4 percent a year (survey means, 
consumption where possible). Deaton’s estimates suggest that the peak in the level of per 
capita consumption in developing countries was reached in 1993; his 3 year growth, 
1990-1993, is a high 4.4 percent; his data shows the same peak being reached twice – 
1993 and 1998; and in his data, over the 3 year period, 1998-2000, the average 
 
consumption level in 2000 (a recovery year) was more than 20 percent lower than in 
1998 (an East Asian crisis year). Thus, all the decadal growth (and more) in Deaton’s 
calculations seems to have occurred in just three years, 1990-93. Both the World Bank 
and our estimates reveal a slow and gradual increase with some acceleration post 1999.  
 
What these data suggest is that some method needs to be found to adjust the survey 
means for different countries since levels of S/NA at 40, 50 and 60 percent etc. are not 
helpful in assessing the nature and magnitude of poverty decline in developing countries. 
Concern is rightly centered on the relative roles of inequality change and consumption 
growth in affecting poverty; unfortunately, large changes in the S/NA ratio introduce a 
considerable amount of measurement error in poverty calculations. This measurement is 
larger than all estimates of inequality change or consumption growth.  
 
A suggested method of deriving consumption growth estimates unaffected by changes in 
the S/NA ratio is as follows. If growth in survey means is equalized to growth in NA 
means, then the data can be left uncorrupted by declines (or increases) in the S/NA ratio. 
This is the estimate of survey means reported in this paper. By keeping the S/NA ratio 
constant to its observed 1987 value, one obtains a growth rate in consumption that is a 
mixture of survey and national accounts data i.e. the original level of consumption from 
the surveys is adjusted by the growth rate in consumption obtained from NA data. The 
growth rate in per capita consumption is thus made equal to the NA per capita 
consumption growth rate.   
 
 
None of the objections to the use of NA consumption data (it is not representative, it is a 
derived estimate etc.) apply to the use of growth rate in NA consumption. The year 1987 
was chosen as the “constant S/NA” year, partly because the trend decline in S/NA ratios 
seems to have accelerated, in many countries around the world, around the late eighties. 
Selection of a different year than 1987 would not change any of the results on growth in 
means, but would change the results on the level of poverty in any given year. The choice 
of 1987 is appropriate because it is near the end of the constancy of S/NA and the 
beginning of the breakdown as indicated by Figures 3.1 and 3.2.   
 
The Irrelevance of Initial inequality for poverty reduction 
 
Before proceeding to the estimation of poverty findings in the next section, a few 
comments on what we should expect with respect to poverty decline over the last two 
decades or so. There has been a lot of discussion about how inequality has hampered the 
decline in poverty. Indeed, one of the most consistent “findings” in the recent 
development literature is that poverty reduction is greater, ceteris paribus, in more 
initially equal economies. The reasoning is assumed to be straightforward: lower 
inequality means a higher share of consumption at a point in time for any given group, 
say the bottom 20 percent; this implies that a higher share of the same growth will accrue 
to the poor in the more equal country; this “higher” growth means a higher magnitude of 
poverty reduction; hence, the simple conclusion that a more equal distribution of 
consumption is desirable for poverty reduction. Several documents have offered this logic 
to advocate a more equal distribution of consumption as a desirable starting point in 
 
discussions of poverty reduction e.g. WDR 1990, WDR 2000/01, Ravallion (2001), 
Klasen (2001), Datt-Ravallion (2002). Some excerpts from the first and last study 
illustrate this belief:  
 
 A 10 percent increase in the incomes of the poor in Bangladesh and India would 
 reduce the incidence of poverty by about 7 percentage points. Where the 
 distribution of income is more unequal, as in Venezuela and Brazil, the 
 corresponding figure would be only 3 percentage points” (WDR 1990, p.47; 
 emphasis added).   
 
 Household survey data for developing countries suggest that initial distribution 
 does matter to how much the poor share in rising average incomes; higher initial 
 inequality tends to reduce the impact of growth on absolute poverty. By the same 
 token, higher inequality diminishes the adverse impact on the poor of overall 
 contraction (Datt and Ravallion, 2002).   
 
It turns out that this reasoning is false, and this was demonstrated as early as 1964 by US 
economist Locke Anderson. He showed that initial inequality was irrelevant for poverty 
reduction. Using data on US poverty, he made the (graphical) point that the rather small 
decline observed in US poverty in the early 1960s, despite rapid growth in per capita 
incomes and not much change in the distribution of incomes, was not at all surprising and 
had a lot to do with “congestion” of the poor near the poverty line.14   
 
 
 For any of these groups, an increase in median income of about 2.5 per cent 
 would reduce the incidence of poverty by 1 percentage point, judging from the 
 slope of the central portion of Figure IV….This analysis suggests that movements 
 along the poverty curve corresponding to the existing income distribution will 
 imply a declining rate of reduction of poverty (Anderson, 1964; emphasis added).   
 
In Imagine, Bhalla (2002) summarizes this movement along the poverty curve as the 
shape of the distribution elasticity or SDE –a quasi-elasticity that yields the total 
arithmetic change in the head count ratio of poverty that can be expected with a 1 
percent change in mean expenditures of individuals clustered around the poverty line. 
Though Anderson does not offer any empirical values for this congestion, our estimated 
value for SDE for the US in the early sixties is around 0.15 i.e. a 10 percent change in 
average incomes of the poor in the US  would affect the head count ratio by only 1.5 
percentage points.  
 
Anderson’s important work was ignored by development practitioners (perhaps because it 
was on a developed economy, USA). Thus, discussion of the impact of the congestion at 
the poverty line on future poverty reductions remained absent until 1990 when the World 
Bank report on Malaysia was published (see Bhalla and Kharas, 1991; the 1990 World 
Development Report also highlighted its importance (neither study was aware of 
Anderson’s work). These two reports, however, did not offer any theoretical or empirical 
estimates of SDE.  
 
 
What the SDE-growth relationship suggests (e.g. the US example) is that there can be 
robust growth in incomes of the poor and yet very little poverty reduction. The following 
admittedly unrealistic but heuristic example is illustrative. Assume the poverty line is 100 
and that most of the poor (the center of gravity) are clustered around a mean income of 
50, and that the standard deviation of the incomes of the poor is 20. An increase in mean 
consumption of 10 percent will have a near-zero impact on the head count ratio. Now 
assume that the mean shifts to 95 and the standard deviation is only 10. Now a 10 percent 
increase in mean consumption will lead to a very large decline in the head count ratio. If 
the poor are now congested at a level close to the poverty line, say 99, the elasticity will 
be close to infinity. So with the same growth in mean consumption of the poor, one 
obtains varying elasticities.   
 
Yet another example, this time perhaps more realistic, explains the workings of the SDE 
on poverty. Growth in expenditures of the poor is the sum of growth from two sources: 
the mean growth in expenditures of the entire population (this is the popular “headline” 
growth variable) and the growth in the share of expenditures of the poor (change in 
inequality but only for those close to the poverty line). Thus, if mean expenditures 
increase by (log) 10 percent, and inequality, measured as the share in total expenditures 
of the population close to the poverty line worsens by (log) 10 percent, then there will be 
no change in net consumption of the poor, and therefore little change in the head-count 
ratio of poverty.   
 
 
 What these examples substantiate is that initial inequality is irrelevant for future poverty 
reduction. This is because the change in poverty is a function of the change in 
consumption at the poverty line. If inequality does not change, then growth cannot have a 
differential impact. When inequality stays constant, the same amount of growth will 
result in the same increase in the consumption of the bottom 20 or bottom 40 percent or 
the top 1 percent. So if a person was poor in 1987 in unequal Brazil or equal India and 
consuming $1 a day, and if both societies experienced a 10 percent change in average 
consumption, and in both societies inequality did not change, then in both societies the 
poor person would be consuming $1.10 in 1998, and in both societies the person would 
be non-poor in 1998; i.e. initial inequality is irrelevant for poverty reduction, as far as a 
direct (independent of the effect on growth) impact is concerned.   
 
What happened to poverty and growth, 1950-2005? 
 
The theoretical and empirical background provided in the previous sections (the 
importance of declines in S/NA, the irrelevance of initial inequality etc.) can yield an 
informed perspective on the ongoing fierce debate on what actually happened to poverty 
over the last three decades. There is the authoritative voice of the World Bank, the 
official referee on poverty, that the decline has been painfully, and surprisingly, slow. 
There is the voice of the dissent, voice of those who argue that the World Bank figures 
are erroneous because it has mis-measured the growth in consumption and therefore 
underestimated the decline in poverty. Determining who is right in this debate can be 
treacherous to one’s view of economists, and statisticians. Given this minefield of a 
background, a useful path for analysis is to first isolate the facts. Facts are presented in 
this section for growth and poverty decline for three different measures of consumption 
growth (the differences in inequality, or distribution, is of minor importance)—World 
Bank data (Survey World Bank or SWB), all available data (Survey data or S), and 
survey to national accounts ratio kept constant at 1987 levels, or SNAk.  
 
There should theoretically be little difference in the poverty estimates yielded by the two 
straightforward unadjusted means and common distribution estimates provided by SWB 
and S—as shown in Table 3.1, the difference was as much as 6 percentage points in 1990  
though in recent years this has come down to only a few percentage points. In 1990 
believing the World Bank versus the alternate all data series would have led to an 
overstatement of absolute poverty in the world of 350 million; in 2004, the overstatement 
is a 100 million. Our S/NA constant series shows poverty to be sharply lower than these 
two series – 1171 million in 1990 (WB estimate 1409) and 464 million in 2004 (WB 
estimate 760 million). 
 
Table 3.1: World Poverty, in percent of population, 1950-2005 




























Year in millions SWB S SNAk   SWB S SNAk 
 
1950 1742 69.7 63.3 66.2  89.1 86.8 87.8 
1960 2120 65.9 59.3 62.5  86.6 84.3 85.2 
1970 2691 57.4 49.7 53.4  82.5 79.6 80.8 
1981 3419 48.2 43 44.1  76.1 73.1 73.4 
1985 3716 38.5 35.6 35  70.9 68.8 68.4 
1990 4113 33.6 28.6 29.7  67.7 64 64 
1993 4342 28.9 26.1 23.1  63.8 60.9 58.7 
1995 4492 28.2 24.2 20.6  62.4 59.5 56.1 
2000 4862 25 21.6 16  57.5 54.1 47.3 
2004 5151 18.6 17.9 9.9  50.4 48.6 40.1 
2005 5225 15.2 14.7 8.4   47.9 45.9 37.2 
 
 Poverty decline since 1981—Very Large  
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 document the enormous decline that has taken place in world poverty 
since 1981. The World Bank itself acknowledges that world poverty has declined from 40 
to 21 percent, 1981 to 2001; our reproduction yields estimates of 48 percent and 24 
percent in the two years. The more accurate SNAk measure of per capita consumption 
has poverty declining from 44 to 15 percent, $1.08 poverty line, and from 73 to 46 
percent, $2.16 poverty line. The percentage point decline, regardless of source or poverty 
line, is a reduction of some 20 to 30 percentage points. The fast pace of developing 
economy growth since 2001 (including sub-Saharan Africa), has meant a further decline 
in poverty to 8.4 percent and 37.2 percent ($1.08 and $2.16 poverty lines, respectively) in 
2005. These statistics suggest that the time has come to raise the world poverty line from 
its $1.08 level—a subject explored in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 3.3a: Percentage of Population Poor, Developing World, 
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Figure 3.3b: Number of Poor in Millions, Developing World, 


























Figure 3.4a: Percentage of Population Poor, Developing World, 




























Figure 3.4b: Number of Poor in Millions, Developing World, 
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Note: S refers to collection of poverty non-World Bank website data (e.g. WIDER); 
SWB refers to World Bank data obtained from its website; SNAk is the survey to 
national accounts ratio kept constant at its 1987 value for each country.  
 
Until the early 1990s, the conventional method for estimating poverty was to obtain the 
distribution from household surveys and impose the mean of per capita consumption 
obtained from national accounts data. In the 1990s, starting with the World Bank World 
Development Report 1990 (WDR 1990), the method changed to obtaining poverty from 
survey means and survey distributions. But in discussions about the impact of growth on 
poverty, the conventional procedure still remains  to use survey based poverty measures 
of poverty and national account (NA) based measures of growth (e.g. WDR (1990), 
Dollar and Kraay (2001), Datt and Ravallion (2002), Besley and Burgess (2003)).   
 
 This questionable procedure of inferring survey based poverty trends from NA estimates 
of consumption growth was dubbed the “Peter-Paul” problem in Imagine, i.e. using 
survey based poverty and growth from national accounts was akin to using Peter’s 
income to determine Paul’s poverty. There is only one consistent method of deriving or 
estimating the impact of growth on poverty—average growth should be calculated from 
the same source as the growth in individual incomes.   
 
When the growth rate of survey means is close to the growth rate of national account 
means, the S/NA ratio stays constant. This is what was observed in most of the world 
prior to 1980s. The fact that the S/NA ratio is less than unity is not disturbing, and nor is 
that it has declined. But the magnitude of the level significantly below unity and the pace 
of this decline poses serious problems for analysis of trends in poverty.   
 
Assuming that the NA growth rate is correct,  declining S/NA ratio means that poverty is 
overstated—the more the decline, the greater the overstatement. To reiterate, the SNAk 
measure uses the same growth rate for each country as the national accounts, at least 
since 1987. In the case of India, the decline of S/NA from 71 to 49 percent (1987 to 
2004/5) is a decline of 35 percent, or an overstatement of poverty of about 20 percentage 
points!   
 
Regardless of the method of poverty calculation, the estimated figures for 2005 are 
revealing. They show the following levels of $1.08 poverty for the three different means 
 
and methods of poverty estimation, SWB, S and SNAk measures—15.2 percent, 14.7 
percent and 8.4 percent, respectively. This means that about the time the World Bank and 
associated international organizations like the UN were getting serious about the 
Millennium Development Goal of 15 percent in 2015, the world had already reached that 
level a decade earlier. Which highlights one of the major results of this paper—it is time 
to raise the poverty line.   
 
Existing Poverty Lines: Too Low 
 
According to our estimates of world poverty, “only” 20 percent of the world population 
was poor in 2001 (survey means) and only 15 percent poor in the same year if the 
declining survey to national accounts ratio is frozen for each country at its 1987 value. 
Even the “high” World Bank estimate of poverty in 2001 is “only” 23.6 percent poor in 
2001, and 19 percent in 2004. The previous sections have documented that a large part of 
the difference in our reproduction of World Bank data and World Bank data arises from 
the unusually high World Bank poverty numbers for India—almost 2 percentage points 
of global poverty. Little difference was obtained between ours and WB estimates for sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
These low poverty estimates are based on a very low level of living, hence, the term 
absolute poverty. What these low levels of numbers signify is that the world poverty 
problem is different today—it is more of a relative poverty problem than a problem of 
absolute poverty. Of course, almost half of sub Saharan Africa is absolutely poor, but this 
 
continent contains only about 300 million absolute poor; and most of the rest of the 
developing world is not absolutely poor.  
 
Latin America and the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) have for more than 
a decade now recorded absolute dollar a day poverty levels in the single digits. For both 
these regions, the domestic, local poverty lines are above $2 a day. The former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe economies do not have much $1 a day poverty, which leads 
one to the conclusion that international agencies should start developing a relative 
measure of poverty.   
 
Table 3.2a:  Poverty Head Count Ratio, in %, 1981-2005 ($1.08 
Poverty Line) 
 Year 
Region 1981 1990 1993 2001 2005 
World Bank data and varying S/NA      
Sub Saharan Africa  43 45 46 40 37 
South Asia  60 45 40 36 24 
East Asia 58 34 25 18 6 
Central Asia 4 4 13 9 6 
Latin America 13 15 14 11 10 
Middle East + North Africa 6 4 2 4 3 
World 48 34 29 24 15 
      
All available data and varying S/NA      
 
Sub Saharan Africa  38 45 41 39 36 
South Asia  45 27 37 26 22 
East Asia 56 32 21 16 4 
Central Asia 5 5 9 8 5 
Latin America 14 20 19 17 15 
Middle East + North Africa 6 4 1 4 3 
World 43 29 26 21 15 
      
All available data and Constant S/NA ratio      
Sub Saharan Africa  38 45 42 41 37 
South Asia  49 26 25 12 5 
East Asia 56 35 22 12 1 
Central Asia 5 5 8 7 5 
Latin America 14 20 19 16 15 
Middle East + North Africa 6 4 2 2 2 
World 44 30 23 15 8 
Source:  World Bank, WIDER, author's calculations    
 
Table 3.2b. Number of Poor, in millions, 1981-2005 ($1.08 Poverty 
Line) 
 Year 
Region 1981 1990 1993 2001 2005 
World Bank data and varying S/NA      
Sub Saharan Africa  170 227 255 271 275 
South Asia  551 499 473 490 348 
East Asia 841 567 447 336 112 
 
Central Asia 2 2 7 5 3 
Latin America 47 64 64 59 58 
Middle East + North Africa 15 14 6 14 11 
World 1626 1373 1252 1176 807 
      
All available data and varying S/NA      
Sub Saharan Africa  150 226 227 262 267 
South Asia  419 302 438 361 324 
East Asia 816 544 365 299 82 
Central Asia 2 3 5 4 3 
Latin America 52 87 87 87 86 
Middle East + North Africa 14 13 5 16 12 
World 1453 1174 1126 1029 774 
      
All available data and Constant S/NA ratio      
Sub Saharan Africa  150 225 232 274 275 
South Asia  454 293 289 165 79 
East Asia 816 595 383 234 10 
Central Asia 2 3 4 4 3 
Latin America 52 87 89 86 84 
Middle East + North Africa 14 13 5 7 6 
World 1489 1216 1002 770 456 





Table 3.3a:  Poverty Head Count Ratio, in %, 1981-2005 ($2.16 
Poverty Line) 
 Year 
Region 1981 1990 1993 2001 2005 
World Bank data and varying S/NA      
Sub Saharan Africa  72 74 74 69 65 
South Asia  92 88 85 82 73 
East Asia 87 70 62 48 35 
Central Asia 20 21 36 23 16 
Latin America 31 34 33 30 28 
Middle East + North Africa 28 19 18 22 18 
World 76 68 64 56 48 
      
All available data and varying S/NA      
Sub Saharan Africa  67 72 69 66 62 
South Asia  86 77 84 74 70 
East Asia 84 67 56 43 31 
Central Asia 16 18 27 27 17 
Latin America 34 42 41 37 36 
Middle East + North Africa 26 19 16 23 18 
World 73 64 61 53 46 
      
All available data and Constant S/NA ratio      
Sub Saharan Africa  67 72 70 70 66 
South Asia  88 76 74 59 47 
East Asia 84 68 57 38 26 
 
Central Asia 16 18 25 20 14 
Latin America 34 42 41 36 35 
Middle East + North Africa 26 19 17 18 14 
World 73 64 59 46 37 
Source:  World Bank, WIDER, author's calculations    
 
Table 3.3b.  Number of Poor, in millions, 1981-2005 ($2.16 
Poverty Line) 
 Year 
Region 1981 1990 1993 2001 2005 
World Bank data and varying S/NA      
Sub Saharan Africa  281 376 408 463 477 
South Asia  849 980 1005 1122 1078 
East Asia 1259 1179 1096 912 689 
Central Asia 9 10 19 13 10 
Latin America 113 151 156 156 156 
Middle East + North Africa 66 60 59 85 73 
World 2576 2755 2743 2752 2482 
      
All available data and varying S/NA      
Sub Saharan Africa  261 366 381 443 455 
South Asia  798 861 990 1023 1037 
East Asia 1222 1128 988 828 604 
Central Asia 7 9 14 15 10 
Latin America 125 185 190 196 198 
Middle East + North Africa 62 59 52 88 76 
 
World 2475 2609 2615 2593 2379 
      
All available data and Constant S/NA ratio      
Sub Saharan Africa  261 365 387 467 483 
South Asia  808 850 878 814 698 
East Asia 1222 1141 1003 722 504 
Central Asia 7 9 13 11 8 
Latin America 125 186 191 192 194 
Middle East + North Africa 62 60 56 68 56 
World 2485 2611 2528 2275 1943 
Source: World Bank, WIDER, author's calculations    
 
Despite rapid per capita growth, the world poverty line has not shifted since the original 
$1 a day poverty line based on 1985 PPP prices. Indeed, the 1993 PPP poverty line of 
$1.08 a day, deemed to be the “equivalent” of $1 a day, 1985 prices, entailed a reduction 
in the poverty line of almost 22 percent (see Imagine for details). US inflation was close 
to 30 percent between 1985 and 1993; since US is the numeraire in PPP calculations, it 
follows that international price inflation was close to 30 percent. Hence, $1 a day in 1985 
prices is approximately equal to $1.3 a day in 1993 PPP prices.   
 
It is necessary to reevaluate what it means to be poor; this, by implication, means that it is 
necessary to raise the international poverty line. What should the new international 
poverty line be? A common, and correct, presumption is that poverty lines should rise 
with economic development. Ahluwalia, Carter and Chenery (1979) present the first set 
of world poverty estimates, calculated for 1975. Since then, per capita consumption in the 
 
developing world has more than doubled. The elasticity of the poverty line with respect 
to average consumption is obtained as 0.63 as illustrated by the following regression for 
92 traditional developing countries in 1993:  
 
log(poverty line) = -0.15 + 0.63*log(per capita consumption)  
 
Data for 92 Countries; R2=0.65; t-Statistic (log consumption): 12.04 
 
If the dollar a day in 1985 prices is deemed as the appropriate poverty line, then the new 
poverty line 20 years later in 2005 prices should be higher in real terms, and higher by the 
amount indicated by the above regression. Mean per capita consumption in the developing 
world in 2005 was 52 percent (or log 42 percent) higher than in 1993. Given a log elasticity 
of 0.63, the new (log) increase in the poverty line should be 0.63*42 or log 26 percent 
higher. Thus, the $1.30 per capita per day in 1993 prices needs to be raised by 30 percent 
(equivalent of log 26 percent). Given an initial poverty line of $1 in 1985 PPP or $1.30 in 
1993 PPP, this yields $1.69 as the new poverty line in 1993 prices. Between 1993 and 2005, 
the US GDP price deflator has increased by 28 percent, which yields an equivalent line in 
2005 PPP$ of 2.16 (1.69*1.28). The international community has been using $1.08 and 
$2.16 as the poverty lines in constant 1993 international prices. It is suggested that $2.16 be 
the new poverty line in PPP 2005 prices.  
 
Latin America has been using a > $2 a day poverty line for some time; the average country-
specific poverty line in Latin America there is a high PPP$5.6 a day; in sub-Saharan Africa, 
 
the average country-specific line is about $1.6. The region with poverty lines needing 
revision is the region with the fastest growth, Asia. Figure 3.3—which is based on the 
regression presented above—poignantly illustrates the large existing gap between mean 
consumption levels and poverty lines in Asia, as well as the rest of the developing world. It 
is apparent that a majority of countries—and especially China, Indonesia and India—had, in 
1993, poverty lines that were far below their predicted poverty lines.   
 
Poverty also is relative. Who the Malaysians (or Argentinians) consider poor will be 
considered middle class in most parts of Asia. It does not make the poor Korean any 
happier to know that several hundred million people are poorer in the rest of the world. 
Each country has its own poverty line to reflect these different country averages of 
standard of living. We have seen above that own poverty lines, especially in Asia, are 
falling behind the poverty lines which should be present. Asian and world poverty has 
declined significantly, and the concept of absolute poverty has receded. Today, absolute 
poverty in most parts of the developing world is relative; hence the need for a new, and 
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World poverty today (circa 2005) is primarily a sub-Saharan Africa problem. In that 
region, about half of the population exists on less than the very low absolute poverty line 
of a dollar a day. The number of absolute poor in Africa is around 275 million. The major 
challenge for the world community is to bring this level of poverty down to Asian, Latin 
American and Middle Eastern levels i.e. less than 10 percent poor.   
 
The rapid rates of growth experienced in most of the developing world over the last 25 
years, and especially over the last 10, has brought about large declines in absolute 
 
poverty, for both the one and two dollar a day poverty lines. A striking feature of this 
development has been the improvement of inequality in the developing world, and this 
improvement has occurred for all the estimates of per capita consumption and distribution 
that exist. This is an intuitive result, and has occurred because the poorest and the most 
populous region in the world in 1980, Asia, has witnessed rapid progress. Such progress 
has been observed in the two giant economies, China and India; it has also occurred in 
Thailand, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Laos, and Indonesia. It is hard to find one 
nation in Asia that has fallen behind, though data are not available for the war torn 
economy of Afghanistan or the closed economy of Myanmar.   
 
The rapid decline in poverty, and to levels unimaginable even a decade ago, means the 
time has come to revise upwards the absolute poverty line. This line has stayed constant 
for almost 25 years, and indeed was lowered when the World Bank changed this line 
from $1 a day, PPP 1985 prices to $1.08 a day, PPP 1993 prices. As happens in all 
countries, our notion of absolute poverty changes (increases) with the average level of 
development. These perceptions are changing, and a sign of success is that we are 
moving towards a notion of relative poverty. As a first approximation, it is suggested that 
we increase the international poverty line to $1.69 in 1993 PPP prices (or about $2.16 in 
2005 PPP prices), a level some 45 percent higher, in real terms, than the old $1.08 
poverty line. Coincidentally, the world poor according to this new poverty line would be 
close to 35 percent, a level that the world was dealing with for the much lower one dollar 
a day line in 1985.   
 
 
On its way to recommending this new poverty line, this chapter also examined some old 
assumptions about the determinants of poverty. In particular, the question of whether and 
how initial inequality affects poverty decline was explicitly taken up. The answer is in the 
negative: there is no theoretical, or empirical, basis to think that initial inequality affects 
future poverty change. Since poverty depends on the congestion near the poverty line, the 
response of poverty decline is different for different for different poverty lines and 
different income levels. For example, in 1981, for the $1.08 poverty line, a 10 percent 
increase in per capita expenditures would be expected to result in a 5.5 percentage point 
decline in absolute poverty; in 2005, the same growth would result in only a 3.5 
percentage point decline. For the $2.16 poverty line, the corresponding responses are the 
reverse: a 10 percent growth in 1981 would have led to a poverty decline of 3.5 
percentage points; today, that same growth would mean a larger, 5.1 percentage point 




For calculation of poverty one needs three items of data—the distribution of 
consumption, the mean, and the poverty line. Countries undertake surveys only on a 
periodic basis, yet figures for individual country, and world poverty, are computed on an 
annual basis. How this is possible is explained below.  
 
Poverty line: This is defined on the basis of 1993 PPP consumption exchange rates 
published by the World Bank.  
 
Distribution of consumption: There are several sources of data on distribution, and 
prominent in this collection is the Deininger-Squire effort of compiling inequality data. 
This exercise has now been undertaken by WIDER and is the primary source of 
information on distribution. Poverty is defined on the basis of per capita consumption. 
Several countries around the world, and primarily in Latin America, have not undertaken 
any consumption survey. For such countries, the income distribution is taken to be equal 
to the consumption distribution.  
 
Mean consumption: This is available from the survey in local currency. All local currency 
means are converted to means and therefore distribution in 1993 PPP consumption prices. 
If a consumption survey was undertaken then the mean is used. If no consumption survey 
was undertaken, then the income survey to national accounts ratio is assumed to be the 
same for consumption. Multiplying this S/NA income ratio by the national accounts 
 
consumption mean (in 1993 prices) yields an estimate of a distribution and mean for the 
year in question. If a country has both a consumption and income survey, then only the 
survey to national accounts ratio for the consumption surveys is used.   
  
For years for which there is no survey: The lagging survey to national accounts ratio is 
assumed for the years going forward and for years going back, in reverse. Assume that a 
survey was undertaken for two years 1985 and 1995. The national accounts estimate is 
available for all the years. This estimate is multiplied by the S/NA ratio for all years 
before and including 1994, and for all years subsequent, the 1995 S/NA ratio is used. 
With this method, data are available for all the years for a country if even it had only 1 
income or consumption survey.   
 
A country with no survey data is not used in the analysis. It enters the global poverty 
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1 This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented at The Initiative for Policy Dialogue and Rockefeller 
Foundation Global Poverty Workshop, March 31-April 1, 2003. I am extremely thankful to Tirthanomoy 
Das for excellent research assistance and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.  
2 Recently, the World Bank has come out with new estimates of PPP data with 2005 as the base year. These 
estimates are controversial because they show, somewhat inexplicably, that per capita incomes in China, 
India and most parts of Asia are about 40 percent lower than what was believed only yesterday. 
3 There are two World Bank estimates of poverty reported in this paper: the actual World Bank estimates as 
reported in Chen-Ravallion (2004) and our estimates of the same, based only on the World Bank method 
and World Bank data. It is expected that the two will differ, but it is also expected that the two estimates 
will not differ by much. As it happens, the figures are very close for 2001 and 2004 but somewhat apart in 
the earlier years. 
4 Sala-i-Martin essentially follows the ACC method while this paper offers a method which uses national 
account growth rates and survey means.  
5 The reader is referred to Imagine, for an extensive discussion of the issues related to poverty 
measurement.  
6 Inequality data (distributions) have been gathered from three major sources, namely, Deininger and Squire 
(1996), WIDER (2008), and data collected from various projects undertaken at Oxus Research: End of 
Asian Poverty?, a report prepared for the Asian Development Bank; Not as Poor, nor as Unequal as you 
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http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp. 
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traditional and 4 from central Asia. The standard practice (and followed by us as well) is to impute the 
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9 World Bank poverty site http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/PovcalNet.html. It reports an urban 
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by us into a per capita per day reading rather than a per capita per year reading.   
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